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CHAPTER EIGHT
HUGO GROTIUS' MODERN CIVIL RELIGION:
SOURCE OF EUROPE'S STOIC LIBERALISM?
JEREMY SETH GEDDERT

Classical Europe is often credited with originating political life. Five
hundred years before Christ, Ancient Greece and Rome initiated the notion
that citizens could govern themselves. Cleisthenes and Brutus fought for
regimes in which no person would hold royal status or stand above the
law. The Acropolis and the Forum remain among the world's most iconic
sites: they draw tourists, inspire political reformers, and lend their names
to modern arenas. These two classical examples are commended to
schoolchildren as the birthplace of today's cherished liberties.
If classical Europe inaugurated political life, modern Europe
bequeathed us its current form. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia not only
concluded the Thirty Years' War, but is also said to have birthed the
modern nation-state system. First, its treaties enshrined the principle of
cuius regio, eius religio, which mandated religious noninterference by
outside authorities. This international pluralism ultimately led to
domestically tolerant regimes of individual liberty. Second, nation-states
then wrote constitutions protecting freedoms of association, speech,
religion, and a host of other claims. Third, among these other eventual
claims was that of universal suffrage, extending political participation
throughout entire linguistically-unified regions. If classical Europe was the
great-grandmother of democracy, its modern descendant might be hailed
as the mother of the nation-state.
Yet the modem nation-state is not simply a chip off the old block, or
even a digitization of the Twelve Tables. First, the character of ancient
liberty is decidedly different from the modem. Benjamin Constant
famously argued that ancient liberty meant the ability to participate in
government. But it did not mean tolerance or security of person. Ancient
Athenian citizens were all entitled to vote in the assembly; a majority of

Hugo Grotius' Modern Civil Religion

127

them famously - and illiberally — voted to execute Socrates. In contrast,
modern polities bind their assemblies to act for liberty.1 Second, the best
thinkers of the ancient world were indirect critics of the rule of law, or at
least of lawyers. Plato's Socrates repeatedly asserts that true justice is
beyond definition, and Aristotle's spoudaios practices a prudence that
varies by situation and avoids one-size-fits-all charters of rights.2 By
contrast, modern nation-states hold dear their written documents and
mantras - all simple enough for democrats to comprehend. Third, the
exercise of citizenship in ancient politics differs from the demands of
today. Ancient democracies invited citizens to participate in their
legislatures, and thus were limited in number by the physical size of their
assembly. They granted citizenship only to male landowners. In contrast,
modern democracies invite citizens only to choose representatives, which
permits participation over a geographic scope that the ancients would have
called an empire.3 Modern states thus extend citizenship to include all
adults. In sum, modem democracies are distinguished from ancient by
their individual rights, written documents, and mass participation. (One
almost wonders if foreign DNA entered the lineage somewhere.)
If the blood of the Thirty Years' War brought forth the modern nationstate, one of the midwives attending this labour was surely the Dutch
politician and intellectual polymath Hugo Grotius. Grotius is sometimes
forgotten today as a crucial figure in this new birth, but he was well known
to his contemporaries far and wide. Already learned by the age of fifteen,
this prodigy was pronounced "the miracle of Holland" by King Henry IV.
In his twenties, he published works of poetry, history, theology,
jurisprudence, and international law. In his thirties, he rose to prominence
as de facto Prime Minister Oldenbarnevelt's right-hand man, only to find
his political stand bringing him a life sentence. He witnessed the outbreak
of the Thirty Years' War in chains. After a daring prison break, he was
exiled from his country, but immediately granted a royal pension in Paris
by Louis XIII. In 1625 he published his magisterial de Jure Belli ac Pads,
a comprehensive treatise seeking a peaceful resolution to the War ravaging
the continent. This work attained for Grotius such pan-European renown
that in 1634 the Swedes named this Dutchman their ambassador to France.
Shortly after Grotius' 1645 death, the University of Heidelberg installed
Samuel von Pufendorf as its first chair in the Law of Nature and Nations, a
field thought to have been established by Grotius. Twentieth-century
scholars still recognized him as the father of international law, and
organizers of a 1983 conference celebrating his quatercentenary chose a
simple but apt title: "Hugo Grotius - A Great European".4
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In the twenty-first century, scholars increasingly credit Grotius with
not only historic but also philosophic import: inventing modern natural
rights. Titans such as Richard Tuck paint a portrait in which Grotius
advances each of the three distinctively modern elements of the state.
First, Grotius rejects the classical teleology of Aristotle in favor of a
modern deontological science of liberties. Gone is classical natural Right;
taking its place are modem individual rights. Second, Grotius' justice no
longer requires attaining internal virtues, but only declining to externally
violate others' property and person.5 Hence, justice no longer resides in
the soul of the wise ruler, but in formulations of law. Third, one of
Grotius' individual rights is the necessity of consent to political subjection.
Hence, all those governed by the state must be permitted to participate in
its elections. In this story, Grotius makes modern Europe possible
precisely by relegating virtue to the private sphere and thus liberating
politics from questions of the soul.
In what follows, I argue that Grotius' philosophic legacy has a
somewhat different character. He does indeed provide a foundation for a
basic set of secular natural rights. Yet in addition to these natural rights, he
frequently speaks of a "wider" virtue - often in c uriously indirect fashion.
This language complicates the standard portrait of a Grotius who lowers
the political standard and eliminates virtue. Indeed, Grotius subtly
insinuates that the maintenance of natural rights actually depends on this
wider virtue.6 What is more, Grotius makes his case by copiously citing
classical authors - in one instance translating verbatim three chapters of
Aristotle in the midst of his own work.7 His modem natural rights seem
not a moon eclipsing classical natural Right but a moon reflecting it.
This reading raises an obvious question: if Grotius does not introduce
natural rights as a way to eclipse virtue, then why does he bother with
them at all? Perhaps the answer has less to do with ontology and more
with epistemology. Natural rights are a way of simplifying moral rules in a
way that makes them comprehensible to many if not all. After all, few
want to wrestle with the subtleties of Socratic discourses when trying to
determine a case in small claims court. Yet Grotius also restricts this
simplification of moral rules to matters of external property and person; it
does not apply to internal virtue. This reveals his recognition that virtue is
not so much a modem doctrine - comprehensive or otherwise - as it is a
classical vision or intuition of the Good. Moreover, the highest realm of
human virtue is now free from imposition by a political realm whose rules
are typically formulated by the many (as Socrates knew all too well).
In sum, I will argue that Grotius develops individual rights in order to
cultivate a minimum level of virtue in the mass populace now invited to
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participate in modern politics, while simultaneously preserving the
possibility of a nondogmatic wider virtue for those capable of it. These
dual aims are grounded in a distinction he borrows from the Stoics, whose
influences on Grotius have been the focus of recent scholarship. This
ethical distinction separates the rules of the many and the virtue of the few.
Through this distinction, Grotius employs his classical European heritage
to shape a modem Europe true to its roots.

Dual Grotian Justice: Rights and Virtue
Grotius begins the body of his De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Right of
War and Peace) with a chapter entitled, "What is jus [or 'Right']?" In
exploring the question, he concludes that justice has two parts. This
follows Aristotle and his medieval heirs. Aristotle first outlines
"arithmetic" justice (which Aquinas would later term "commutative"),
which governs transactions between individuals. He then discusses
"geometric" justice (or Aquinas' "distributive" justice), which considers
how the state honours worthy individuals. In other words, commutative
justice is private justice, and distributive justice is public justice.
Grotius likewise divides justice in two. Yet he proposes different
category names: "strict" and "wider" justice. These new names correspond
to a different criterion by which to delineate the two categories. The most
basic division of justice is not, pace Aristotle, private vs public justice.
Rather, the division concerns the "matter at hand".
Grotius states that the matter at hand in strict justice is "to give each
his due". By defining the matter this way, Grotius keeps strict justice
simple and intelligible. It is nothing but the familiar classical definition of
justice. In fact, Aristotle and Aquinas had used this definition to
encompass both sub-categories of justice: private and public.8
Grotius' strict justice is so called for several reasons. First, it is strictly
concerned with external, visible acts. It need not examine the character of
the person on whom the just duty or liberty falls. A bad person may
exercise the same liberty as a good one. Strict justice is not a matter of
changing one's character; it is a matter of fulfilling an act. For this reason,
Grotius describes strict justice as "perfect"; it can be carried out perfectly,
even by one whose character is far from ideal.9
Second, strict justice can be formulated in propositions that fully
capture its essence. It mandates duties that are meticulous and provides
liberties that are specific. In its exactitude, strict justice precisely
determines whether a person's acts conform to its dictates or deviate from
them. Moreover, strict justice is clear, allowing lawmakers to enshrine its

130

Chapter Eight

dictates in an authoritative code of law and thus to make them available to
all. Indeed, strict justice is promulgated more as reminder than as
education. Its hearers should already know its content, because that
content is available to them in pure reason. Strict justice reveals itself to
the unassisted human mind, regardless of time, place, and context. Experts
and novices alike can attain to its truths, just as both adults and children
can perform basic arithmetic. Strict justice needs no specific wisdom or
expert interpretation, even by lawmakers; it only needs to be read.
The third element of strict justice follows from this accessibility: its
provisions are mandatory for all. Strict justice does not simply govern
experts in political thought; it imposes legitimate demands on all. None of
its subjects can legitimately claim ignorance of its duties. Nor can its
subjects quibble with the content, because its duties command restraint
rather than action. As Grotius says, they are just "in a negative rather than
a positive sense".10 Hence, these duties cannot be accused of imposing a
comprehensive doctrine on their subjects, or causing those subjects to
actively violate their consciences. Finally, the duties of strict justice are
few in number: five. One renders to others their due by respecting the life
and property of others; returning unjustly-taken property; providing
restitution; keeping promises; and punishing those who violate the
above."
Yet if Grotius' strict justice has included both the private and public
realms, it has not necessarily included all private and public acts.1" Indeed,
some such acts are instead overseen by "wider" justice, which Grotius
variously renders as "attributive", "rectoral", "governmental , or
"internal" justice. But what public or private acts could be part of justice if
they are not already included in the aforementioned "matter at hand of
giving someone their due? What is the remaining matter of wider justice?
What is (its) material?
Grotius declines to set out this matter in clear and perfect terms, such
that its content has vexed some scholars and eluded scores more.
Strangely enough, this murkiness seems appropriate. After all, if strict
justice is defined by its clarity, wider justice could not partake of the same.
Yet perhaps the answer to the matter is nonetheless hiding in plain sight.
This wider justice - here styled "attributive" - attends to "those virtues
that do good to others, such as liberality, mercy, and prudence in
governing."14 The term "virtue" is crucial. Perfect justice had required no
special virtue: no expertise to interpret its provisions, no long list of duties
whose fulfillment is intangible or ongoing, and no heroism to perform
positive acts of virtue. Indeed, strict justice did not necessarily require any
virtue of the will at all. One needed only to carry out an act - perhaps
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grudgingly or even under compulsion. Grotius' seemingly casual mention
of virtue in wider justice is in fact its essence.
Grotius both clarifies and expands on this answer when he says that the
"largest extent" of jus "obliges us to that which is good and
commendable." This goodness and commendableness again forms a
contrast with strict justice.15 The mere absence of infractions may render
one passively innocent of legal wrongdoing, but it does not qualify one as
actively "good". For instance, if a Prime Minister chooses Cabinet
ministers at random from his caucus, he is innocent of violating rights;
each minister meets the criterion of being a Parliamentarian, and no
individual member could claim a strict right to any Cabinet seat. But such
a Cabinet-maker would fail to be commendable under attributive justice
because of his unwise choices. What is more, wider justice does not
simply give what is due; it may also give more than what is strictly due.
For example, if a Prime Minister spends her weekends volunteering at a
soup kitchen, she would be going above and beyond what her electors
could demand by right. Wider justice calls for a sacrificial giving that
demonstrates goodness. It does not simply render to others as a duty, but it
gives to others as a gift. In doing so, it both demonstrates and cultivates
virtue in the one who exercises it.

Dual Stoic Ethics: Kathekon and Katorthoma
This dual sense of justice calls into question the standard portrait of
Grotius as a mere subjective rights theorist who burns his bridges with
classical natural Right. True, Grotius' strict justice may blaze a trail for a
modern concept of individual liberty. Yet his wider justice seems to leave
intact the pathway to classical virtue. Nonetheless, if this wider justice
builds on the classics, it does not tread exactly the path of Aristotle. When
Grotius outlines justice, he cites thinkers Roman in equal measure to those
Greek. These debts to Rome have been the focus of increased scholarly
attention, particularly in the work of Benjamin Straumann. Straumann
suggests that Grotius' treatment is heavily Stoic, and particularly explores
Grotius' use of Cicero's dialogue De Finibus.
In De Finibus, Cicero's Cato sets out what Straumann calls the "entire
ethical system of the Stoa".16 This system begins with oikeiosis: a
recognition of oneself. This might appear a rather solid foundation for a
modern science of individual duties and rights. Yet the reality is more
complex. As Straumann himself outlines, this recognition of oneself as a
person points toward a teleological philosophical anthropology that
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contains two elements. These two facets of human nature will, in turn,
point toward two elements of ethical practice: kathekon and katorthoma.
The first element of human nature is indeed the human animal impulse
toward self-preservation. Here humans pursue tangible goods not valuable
for their own sake, but only useful for their extrinsic benefit to selfpreservation - that is, their instrumentality to private preferences. This
corresponds to the ethical category of kathekon, sometimes translated as
"appropriate action". In De Finibus, Cicero states that kathekon does not
correspond to what is truly good or what fully accords with human
nature.17
A wider Stoic treatment of kathekon confirms this Ciceronian reading
while also broadening it. For instance, Stobaeus and Diogenes Laertius
extend kathekon (here rendered as "proper function") to non-human
animals.18 To them, kathekon is an external act carried out by a sentient
being, but not necessarily a voluntary act. Acts of kathekon are reasonable
in the sense that they actually do conduce to self-preservation. Yet this
reasonable principle may manifest itself in the form of instinct or
inclination rather than self-conscious logic. To take an obvious example,
animals are capable of preserving themselves and their species without
reason. However, many humans also merely follow a rule by habit (Plato's
doxa) rather than through determining for themselves its conformity to
human ends (Plato s nous). As Long and Sedley point out, kathekon does
not refer...to the doer's disposition or whole plan of life."19 It is an act not
carried out in conscious awareness of its role in a full human life.
However, Stoic philosophical anthropology does not end here. Its
second component does point to what is highest in human nature: that
which transcends animal instinct. This requires an ascent to katorthoma.
Katorthoma is a special function of kathekon that is sometimes rendered as
perfect proper functions". But katorthoma is not merely the complete
performance of the aforementioned acts of self-preservation. Rather, its
perfection is "illustrated by reference to virtues". The virtue of katorthoma
evaluates the moral character of the agent."-0 Hence, the perfection of
katorthoma comes not from the act, but from the character of the human
agent that carried it out. To be precise, a katorthomatic action is carried
out not for its extrinsic benefits, but for intrinsic motives. In fact, the doer
of katorthoma is agnostic about the consequences of the act; he carries out
the act even if there is no extrinsic benefit. This befits its central place in a
Stoic ethics that is ultimately concerned with "a transformation in one's
motivational orientation."21
For this reason, the mere actions of katorthoma, "taken by themselves,
provide no means of distinguishing two moral classes of men."22 Stobaeus
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illustrates this point by quoting Chrysippus: "the man who progresses to
the furthest point performs all kathekon without exception and omits
none." The undiscerning observer - perhaps one lacking katorthoma may see the man of katorthoma as merely a man of kathekon. Yet there
remains a crucial underlying difference. To continue Chrysippus' words,
"happiness supervenes [in the same man's life] when these intermediate
actions acquire the additional properties of firmness and tenor and their
own particular fixity."23 The man of katorthoma acts in ways that flow
from his settled character. In Aristotle's terms, he is not merely continent
but actively virtuous. In other words, the goodness of his action is not
simply a matter of his acts. If he grudgingly gives away his goods upon
pain of legal enforcement, his act is right but his will is not actively good.
This would be mere kathekon. Hence, a disposition of katorthoma may
sanctify even the most prosaic acts of kathekon. Even simple acts such as
"talking, walking about, leaving town, and the like" may be katorthomatic
if animated by internal virtues such as prudence.24
Hence, while acts of kathekon are legitimate and even good, they are not
the fullness of human existence. In the words of Cicero, "the former
[kathekon] are means to the latter [katorthoma]."25 The former are "nature's
primary requirement, but not...the ultimate good, since [katorthoma] is not
present in the first affdiations of nature."26 Katorthoma may not be
temporally first, but it is ontologically primary. The relation between these
two Stoic categories highlights the nonpropositional character of the latter.
Merely following a rule to complete a tangible duty is no guarantee of
virtue. The act is immediately verifiable by the five senses, but the virtue
that may have motivated the act is not. Virtue transcends rule-following.
This dual Stoic concept of human nature is almost exactly that of
Grotius. Grotius begins his study of human nature by stating that it
prompts men - like animals - to their own advantage: this is Stoic
oikeiosis. Men are given a reason that deduces "general principles", in
order for each to pursue this interest in peace with others. These general
principles are the content of Grotius' strict justice, and they outline the
rules by which interests may licitly compete. However, Grotius then states
that humans are most clearly distinguished from animals not by such
calculative reason, but by a moral judgment of good and bad and a prudent
imagination of the future. Accordingly, natural Right also has a wider
extent, which prudently considers persons and manages political affairs. It
involves active judgment, rather than merely leaving others in quiet
possession of their rights.27 This grounds Grotius' wider justice, which
involves honestum: that which is honourable or commendable.28
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Grotius later illustrates this implicit distinction between kathekon and
katorthoma through two subsequent concepts. The first is his
jurisprudential distinction between the "deed" and the "doer". One may
commit an unjust deed by coming into invalid possession of a title deed. A
common example is the refusal of one contracted party to pay what the
other party demands, due to a sincere misunderstanding of the ambiguous
contract terms. The law demands that such a person satisfy the debt in civil
court, and no more. Such redress effectively undoes the initial unjust act of
possession. In contrast with the unjust deed, one becomes an unjust doer if
one knowingly steals from another. Such a person is liable not simply to
civil damages but to criminal sanction.29 What is more, in such a case the
law cannot stipulate a particular sentence in advance, because the
punishment does not address the external act but the internal character of
the offender. The distinction between civil redress and criminal
punishment delineates external act from internal intent in much the same
fashion as kathekon and katorthoma.
The second illustrative concept is Grotius' extensive discussion of
"external" and "internal" justice in regard to waging war. External justice
permits a wide range of military acts, as long as the cause of the war is
just. After all, the targets of the war have forfeited their rights through
their prior injustice, and the just warriors are entitled to defend their own
lives as they prosecute the campaign. Here self-preservation permits to the
just warrior all manner of killing, despoiling, pillaging, and conquering.
Yet internal justice nonetheless enjoins the warrior to fight according to
the virtue of moderation or "humanity", exercising equity and even mercy
toward her opponents. For example, the katorthomatic warring party
inflicts harm only to punish, rather than to satisfy animalistic desires of
revenge - even if the physical harm itself appears identical in either case.
Hence, the punisher is careful to connect the imposed suffering to the
subject's prior unjust act. She also refrains from imposing a death
sentence that would prevent any future reformation of the subject. Again,
such punitive war cannot be a one-size-fits-all punishment enshrined in
legal codes that apply uniformly to all. External justice permits a wide
range of licit acts of kathekon, but internal justice calls for both restraint
and prudence out of a of katorthomatic intention.30
Hence, Grotius' concept of justice incorporates a public virtue that is
broadly familiar both to Aristotle and the Stoics, and obsolete to their
modern critics. However, his specific treatment of virtue in conjunction
with justice appears to depart from Aristotle to join the Stoics. When
Grotius introduces a strict justice that coheres with kathekon, he develops
a modern-looking approach of propositional formulations and individual
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rights. Yet by adding a wider justice that builds on katorthoma, he
conserves the classical understanding of nonpropositional natural Right.
Grotius' overall treatment of Stoic ethics requires us to explore one
further Stoic concept that he does not adopt so straightforwardly. It is easy
to focus on the distinction between the lesser kathekon and the greater
katorthoma. Yet for the Stoics, one who merely follows the rules of
kathekon actually falls within the penumbra of human wisdom. While
kathekon may not be intrinsically good, it nonetheless partakes of
goodness, because it follows a rational principle despite its own ignorance
of that source of reason (such as when an animal pursues the preservation
of its species). Unlike animals, humans have the choice to reject reason and many do. Those who actually do choose kathekon earn some
association with wisdom because so many others fail to do even this much.
Indeed, Stoic ethics divides "all mankind into two absolute categories, the
wise and the foolish", and considers the wise (including doers of kathekon)
to be extremely rare throughout history.31 Even kathekon is a rarity. This
Stoic attitude displays a classical elitism, perhaps one akin to a Platonic
pessimism about the prevalence of true virtue, born of the obvious
despondency of a city that condemned Socrates to death.
While the thrust of the present argument is to show Grotius' broad
continuity with classical Greece and his specific continuity with Stoicism,
we now reach a point where Grotius breaks with both. Grotius' strict
justice aligns closely with the propositional Stoic concept of kathekon. Yet
for Grotius, this very simple propositionality renders it comprehensible to
all, much like the truths of basic arithmetic. Because everyone can
understand it, everyone can be expected to follow it (and for that reason
coerced to follow it).32 Grotius effectively argues that while the vast
majority are not capable of katorthoma, they are yet capable of kathekon.
While Grotius shares the classical view that the many are inadequate to the
highest sense of internal virtue, he believes that they are nonetheless
capable of following basic rules that are obvious to unassisted reason.
Grotius' belief in the wide capacity to kathekon enables the third element
of the modern nation-state: its extension of citizenship to all adults.

The Soul of Christianity: Not Dogma But Virtue
Grotius' extension of political participation to the masses finds a thick
parallel in his Christian theology. Despite Grotius' common reputation as
a secularist, he in fact wrote works of political theology, ecclesiology,
Scriptural drama, Atonement doctrine, and Biblical exegesis. One such
work is de Imperio (On the Governing Authority of the Supreme Powers
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Concerning Sacred Things), an ostensible treatise of political theology that
also contains his fullest account of political authority. Most immediately
relevant are its insights into Grotius' concept of what we might call
citizenship in Christianity, because they buttress his argument for mass
participation in politics. In fact, Grotius' apparent modernity in this regard
may have more to do with his Christianity than any supposed secularism.
In particular, when we examine Grotius' Christianity, we again see an
implicit distinction between kathekon and katorthoma. Grotius' list of
dogmatic essentials involves clear and immutable duties, such as those of
kathekon. These essentials of Christianity - much like those of strict
justice - are few in number.33 Moreover, they are apparent to all Christians
- including the early Christians who typically lacked access to higher
learning. It is true that Grotius cites early Christian luminaries such as
Lactantius and Augustine as frequently as he does their secular Roman
counterparts like Cicero and Seneca. But Grotius' Renaissance outlook
seeks to recover not simply the learning of Christian Rome but even
moreso its virtue.
Hence, when Grotius turns his attention to the essence of Christianity,
he emphasizes moral over intellectual virtues. The fullness of the faith is
not reserved for theologians who refine the precision of doctrine. On the
contrary, it is available to the unlearned, if they will only instantiate the
Christian moral virtues in their being. Praying may be more helpful than
reading.34 Hence, the specific duties of Christianity are not complex.
Rather, the challenge seems to arise in carrying these out full-heartedly
rather than ritualistically - whether one is sophisticated or simple.
This explains why many Christian saints are people of humble station
and meagre learning. They are not sanctified by their adherence to doctrine
- a test that would only mark them as ordinary Christians. Indeed, experts
in theology are surprisingly scarce in the Christian pantheon, and less than
five per cent of second-millennium Popes have even made the cut. If
sainthood is not defined by knowledge of Christian doctrine, what then are
its criteria? To ask the question is perhaps to miss the point. Like classical
virtue, sainthood is ultimately beyond definition. Like the spoudaios, one
recognizes the saint by being in her presence. Once again, Grotius'
Christianity reinforces his commitment to katorthoma - one that Socrates
would surely endorse.
Hence, if one wants to find the "soul of the church", one should look to
times and places where the entirety of the church - from theologians to
peasants - was in concord and unity. One such example cited by Grotius is
that of the early church, admired throughout Christian history. 35
Conversely, in his apologetic work De Veritate Religionis Christianae (On
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the Truth of the Christian Religion), he argues that the early church's
eventual descent into doctrinal factionalism was the precondition for the
rise of Islam. He especially indicts clerical speculation: "as of old,
preferring the tree of knowledge to the tree of life,...nice inquiries were
esteemed more than piety, and religion was made an art."36
In other words, religious speculation is not simply an alternative to
harmonious piety, one that redirects energy away from worship toward
mental gymnastics. It may actually be an enemy of godliness, leading to
controversy, internal strife, and even schism.37 Hence, the Christian spirit
is best served by refraining to define matters other than "those doctrines
necessary or very profitable for salvation." For example, Grotius points
out that the church overcame the Pelagian heresy without taking strict
positions on free will and predestination.38
There may be another reason for Grotius' discomfort with dogma.
Christianity ultimately rests not in a dogmatic code, but in the second
person of the Trinity, who demonstrates the heights of sacrificial charity.
Inasmuch as Christ does issue commands, he says, "be ye perfect". If one
must fully carry out this command, what person could ever meet the
standard? No person can match Christ's condescension to earth and death
on behalf of others who had wronged him. If only perfect rule-followers
could be Christians, there would be none to be found.
Christ's death, of course, overcomes this universal human incapacity,
and Grotius offers one attempt to work out the mechanics in his Atonement
theology. In brief, Christ's substitutionary punishment permits God the
governor to relax the law mandating eternal punishment of all sinful
humans. Grotius describes God's pardon using the words of the ancients:
it is "not according to the law, yet not against it; but rather, above the law,
and instead of it." 39 He might well have described virtue - whether
political or Christian - in the same words.

Politics and the Need for (Reasonable) Religion
Hence, Grotius' approach to the virtue of the few and the rules of the
many is no less present in his theology than in his political philosophy.
However, this commonality does not simply mean that religion and
politics are on parallel tracks. Rather, in Grotius' account, they each
interweave in ways that strengthen the other. Religious moral precepts and
sanctions directly benefit the state. What is more, even its doctrines and
ceremonies bring indirect benefit, as they focus their participants' minds
on God and thus turn their souls toward the good. Grotius buttresses this
argument by citing Plato's Republic, which further shows that his virtue is
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existential and not merely intellectual. Hence, while the "prime and
principal [human] end" of religion is intrinsically worthwhile, it also
provides extrinsic benefits to politics. In particular, Christian citizens are
"quiet, obedient, patriotic, and adherents of justice and equity."40
However, there is a further and deeper reason why Christianity benefits
politics. As we know, Grotius believes that the many are capable of
believing in the dogma of the state constitution. The same is true of them
regarding the sacred analogue of religious doctrine. When they adhere to
such kathekon, whether political or religious, they participate in a higher
goodness. However, many do not fully understand the higher reality of
which those rules are only a second-order derivation. They do not
understand the intention behind the rules, and thus likely lack intrinsic
motivation to follow them. For this reason, they must be given extrinsic
motives to act according to the rational guidance of kathekon. Politics
offers one set of extrinsic motives: the rewards and punishments of the
state. Christianity offers another set of extrinsic motives: the divine
rewards and punishments of eternity.
However, politics - unlike religion - encounters a problem: no state
can ever perfectly enforce conformity to the law. Those that try are
sometimes called "totalitarian". Without the threat of divine punishment,
can people truly be counted on even to keep their secular promises? This is
the question posed by Glaucon in the Ring of Gyges fable. Socrates
clinches his argument in the final book of the Republic by appealing to the
immortality of the soul. Alexis de Tocqueville later answers this question
in similar fashion: without religion, men would be overcome by the
"innumerable temptations of fortune", becoming "daring innovators" and
"implacable disputants" who advance "the maxim that everything is
permissible".41 For this reason, conformity even to kathekon may require
an all-seeing divine judge who is guaranteed to catch lawbreakers,
including those who elude the arm of the state. Of course, this divine judge
is also an executive whose eternal rewards and punishments exceed those
of the state by a goodly margin.
For this reason, Grotius later adds at least two additional elements to
the aforementioned five principles of strict justice. First, one must believe
in a sovereign and good God who takes interest in the affairs of the world.
Second, one must also believe that this God gives just rewards and
punishments to immortal souls in the afterlife.42 Thus, according to
Grotius, political justice cannot support itself without basic elements of
theology. A mass politics requires religion.
But in Grotius' eyes, politics does not require adherence to Christian
religion. Grotius' religious mythos is not a particularistic one appropriate
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only to those who accept Christian revelation - or any other particular
revelation. Rather, these two religious principles of strict justice are
elements of natural religion. Any religion truly worthy of the name must
include them. In other words, even in the absence of special divine
revelation, reason dictates the necessity of religion and outlines its
minimum content. The religious myth required for politics is in fact a
rational myth. As a Christian, Grotius is particularly alert to this idea of
rational myth, because his God is the Word (logos). Catholic Christianity
has historically understood itself as permitting an understanding of
religion through reason. For instance, Aquinas presents his five proofs of
God's existence on the basis of reason rather than divine revelation.43
What is more, natural religion is knowable to all through unassisted
reason. As a result, it can be legitimately demanded of all, which is to say
that it can be coerced by the state. Grotius then explores the implications
for foreign military coercion. He emphatically denounces the injustice of
wars for conversion to a particular religion, because no one can be coerced
into believing a particular revelation that they have not seen. But Grotius
is not a cultural relativist; people can still be held accountable to that
which reason makes plain. Hence, he licenses wars undertaken to punish
other nations for impiety toward God, known to reason as the eternal
judge. What is more, Grotius does not simply condone punishment for
sacrilege toward the Christian God. He also mandates punishment for the
treason of other peoples toward the gods of their own religion, which by
definition would have to include a righteous eternal judge.44
Hence, Grotius offers a robust yet non-particularistic defense of natural
public piety. Without it, even the most purely modem, secular, and
procedural elements of justice cannot stand. Although the state comes
about through the procedural method of consent, its members cannot be
counted on to keep their promises without something beyond politics. In
other words, the person cannot hope to attain their rational and political
telos without something beyond secular reason and politics. As Long
states, '"living in agreement with nature' is the standard Stoic definition of
the ethical end."45 But for all of Grotius' clear Stoic inspiration, we can
now see why he says that "it is not enough simply to live in accordance
with nature." Nature demands religion.46 Hence, if Grotius is a modem
liberal, he is not one who relegates religion to the private sphere. Virtues
of religion are crucial to the maintenance of a liberal political order.47
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Religion and the Need for Political Oversight
Yet if Grotius advances the provocative thesis that politics depends on
religion, he also advances an equally controversial belief that religious
virtue requires politics. This is, in fact, the primary purpose of De Imperio.
Grotius penned it in response to the Dutch religio-political controversy
that would ultimately result in his own imprisonment. The orthodox
Calvinist party had asked the state to convene a synod to define the "five
points of Calvinism". Grotius asked the state not to convene one. But both
sides took for granted the Erastian role of the state in governing the
church. (In a historical paradox, early seventeenth-century Holland was
known as a beacon of religious tolerance in which many dissenters - such
as Descartes - found refuge.)
In this work, Grotius asserts that a ruler cannot "neglect knowledge of
church government" for the specific reason that "nothing is more excellent
than this or more important to the integrity of the state."48 Why is he so
comfortable entrusting church government to a lay supreme power? One
might be tempted to argue that religious myth simply serves the state: the
political ruler cynically manipulates religion for state purposes. But for
Grotius, religious myth primarily serves religious practice, and only
secondarily political promises. His citations come from Plato and
Aristotle, not Averroes and Marsilius.
Rather, Grotius may be Erastian because of his emphasis on practice
over doctrine. Christian doctrines are so few in number and so evident in
content that the Christian governor can hardly fail to comprehend and
defend them.49 Indeed, this lay governor's very lack of further theological
learning will prevent him - in contrast to the theologians - from becoming
attached to speculative doctrines on non-essential matters. This prepares the
governor for his central function: to foster unity and prevent schism. The
governor's task is more practical than propositional. The governor's
political skill (not to mention monopoly on coercive force) makes him
well-suited to this task. Grotius approvingly cites Constantine's invocation
of cloture on dogmatic debate, and exhorts the governors of his day to do
likewise.50
Grotius thus carefully separates the speculative function of theologians
(or philosophers) from the unifying function of governors. The latter is
more concerned to combat schism than heresy. Indeed, while Grotius
hopes that the ruler will be a Christian, apostasy does not invalidate his
rule, even in his function as church governor. As Grotius has said earlier,
the ruler needs no detailed knowledge of the minutiae of Christian
doctrine. Rather, he needs to know how to promote order. A nonbelieving
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ruler may still be effective in this role, and - like a third-party judge - may
be even less inclined to take sides in the dogmatic controversy.51
Indeed, one of the benefits of interweaving politics into religion is that
the political mler may even nudge religion into conversation with citizens of
other religions. By doing so, the mler may help adherents of any particular
religion to frame their public arguments in ways that are intelligible to those
of other religions. After all, Grotius' Christian arguments for God's
existence and righteous judgment overlap with the arguments of all
genuine religions for the same. This anticipates Tocqueville's praise of
America, in which "each sect adores the Deity in its own peculiar manner,
but all the sects preach the same moral law in the name of God." This
moral law is based on the prospect of divine reward and punishment, and
beyond that, "the peculiar tenets of that religion are of very little
importance" to the governor.52
What is more, political protection against overly-defined religious
dogma helps to preserve space for those few who are capable of attaining
katorthoma, or intrinsic virtue. On the most basic level, this protection
preserves a liberty to disagree on higher matters, and thus an ability to
speak out without fearing for one's life. These basic minimums protect the
virtuous few from Socrates' fate at the hands of democracy. On a deeper
level, however, religious liberty protects against the impression that
Christianity (or philosophic wisdom) is reducible to rule-following. This
enables the realization among those who have attained kathekon that a
higher standard is still available. It also protects against the misperception
that virtue can be finite. Beyond the basic rules of strict justice, the
demands of virtue can never be perfectly fulfilled, and thus the state
cannot (pace Aristotle) give rewards upon such completion. This retreat
preserves greater space for the intrinsic motives of katorthoma. After all, if
the state were to incentivize higher virtue, could we be certain that its
honourees had acted for intrinsic reasons? Is there not some tension at the
heart of Aristotle's distributive justice?53
Hence, a liberal state that does not formally promote virtue might
actually better preserve the preconditions for genuine virtue. Perhaps the
modern liberal state is incapable of publicly taking seriously the highest
aims of human existence. But perhaps all states are so limited - and
perhaps the goodness of the modem state is that it does not try. Liberalism
may be at its best when it pulls back from comprehensive doctrines
precisely to allow them to re-emerge from a parallel source. Its limitation
may be its strength. To say that the modem liberal state typically adopts
this approach self-consciously and with full intention might be to ascribe
to it a katorthoma that it does not deserve. But even if it does this
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unconsciously, it at least partakes in the penumbra of goodness known as

kathekon. That might be reason enough for its classical European

grandparent not to disown it.

Classical Grotius and Modern Europe
Hugo Grotius is increasingly credited as the herald of modern Europe.
His historical and personal situation places him at a sort of crossroads: a
Christian with a Renaissance education, an intellectual with political
instincts, a proud Dutch citizen with a European reputation, an advocate
for peace and justice during a time of war. He was recognized by his
contemporaries as having established the field of law among nations
providing a framework for the emerging modern nation-state order that is
today one of Europe's gifts to the world.
Grotius' philosophic role in shaping modern Europe is perhaps even
more crucial. In this regard, most observers see him as ushering in a
rights-based order that liberates Europe from its teleological past. This
permits a political pluralism and confines religion and philosophy to the
private sphere. He also supposedly organizes and codifies morality around
a set of tangible principles easily enshrined in state constitutions. These
principles mandate a liberal non-interference rather than demanding
positive action. Finally, in codifying justice, he makes possible an
egalitarian politics of universal participation. In this reading Grotius
might be seen as a precursor to the rights-based pan-Europeanism of the
European Union. If Hobbes claims to be the founder of a new modern
political science, perhaps he is a usurper of Grotius' rightful title.
Yet if my argument is correct, Grotius is a great European for quite the
opposite philosophical reasons. If Grotius prepares the way for a
distinctively modern European nation-state, he does so (unlike Hobbes) by
building on the classical inheritance of Europe. His apparent support for
the modern liberal nation-state is in fact meant to safeguard virtue in a
mass age. First, if his religious claims and understandings of virtue are
mostly uncoercible by the state, this does not mean that they lack political
import. Rather, his subjective rights are meant to protect the philosopher
or religious believer, whose belief in a trans-political reality might
otherwise threaten an illiberal sovereign. Indeed, religious virtue is central
to maintaining a secular order based on consent, because only the rewards
and punishments of God can truly guarantee promises. Second, if Grotius
proposes a set of clear, distinct, and limited principles of political justice
it is not because those principles exhaust morality. Rather, it is because
they safeguard those who - like Socrates - recognize a virtue "not
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according to the law, but not against it." These propositional formulations
govern only the lower realms of human existence precisely to point to
higher realms that transcend such governance. In addition, Grotius is able
to impose a set of binding negative proscriptions on the masses that will
ensure their continence (if not exactly their virtue). This is fitting for a
mass age in which deference to authority is minimal and governments
must find a way to persuade a mass society of the truth of their
pronouncements. Third and finally, if Grotius invites all to participate in
citizenship, it is not because of a proto-Rousseauian belief in the inherent
goodness of all people. Rather, his deviation from classical Greek and
Roman pessimism about the masses is more likely due to a classical
Christian conviction that even the best are limited by sin and even the
masses can be touched by grace. And his Christian belief in God as logos
allows him to outline his foundational religious principles in a
nonparticularistic epistemology that makes them comprehensible to all.
The Middle Eastern influence in the European lineage - that of
Christianity - may actually bring out the best in Europe.
The assistance of the classical Grotius in the delivery room of modern
Europe suggests that Europe's bloodlines are not new but old, and that its
history is not simply a legacy but a living reality. Like a rebellious
youngster, Europe may resemble her grandmother more than she realizes and perhaps more than she wishes. But when crises arrive - and several
seem to be on the horizon - she may be grateful to have somewhere to
turn.
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Mayer (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 1.2.9, 291-93.
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Grotius, DJB 2.20.46.1, 1035. Grotius here abridges his list in DJB 2.20.45.1,
1032-33, where he had listed four principles of natural religion. This abridgement
also echoes the two principles he outlines in Meletius 6-8, 105-06. In De Veritate
3.12, 48-49, he outlines several additional principles.
Grotius considers himself to be catholic, as shown by the title of his Atonement
treatise: "A Defence of the Catholic Faith".
44 Grotius, DJB 2.20.40-43, 1021-27; 2.20.50-51, 1050-52.
45 Long and Sedley, 365.
46 Grotius, Meletius 86, 132.
One might point out that this discussion deals only with the masses, whether
political or religious. Is the saint of katorthoma not exempt from the need for
eternal judgment to motivate virtue? Does he not already do for intrinsic motives
what the weak do for extrinsic motives? Without claiming a full answer for this
question, one might at minimum point to the Book of Job - the religious reciprocal
to the Ring of Gyges. Here Job is held up as a saint precisely because he is
virtuous even when punishment is guaranteed.
48 Grotius, De Imperio 6.6, 298-99.
Ibid., 5.9, 268-75. Grotius does admit the possibility that the governor may rule
badly on these matters. However, all men are fallible; passing this role on to
someone more expert is no guarantee of good government.
50 Ibid., 5.9, 268-75; 6.9, 308-13; 8.6, 380-83.
Grotius adds that Divine Providence is able to work through bad rulers as well as
good ones. After citing Augustine, he says, "sometimes calm weather is more
useful to the church, sometimes a storm." (Ibid., 8.2, 375-77.)
52 Tocqueville, 1.2.9, 290-91.
53 See also Geddert, Hugo Grotius and the Modern Theology of Freedom, 210-13.
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